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Abstract Migrant communities’ homeland-oriented political campaigns are always 
related to, but often different from, the activism in which local people engage in their 
homeland setting. In seeking to understand the observed disparities between migrant 
campaigns and homeland activism, several studies have demonstrated the influence of 
contextual factors like political opportunity structures on homeland-oriented migrant 
politics. Complementing these studies are works that focus on changes to identity and 
belonging associated with migration and resettlement. In this article, I build on these 
debates by offering a combined analysis of the intersections between, and interplay of, 
contextual and identity-based factors. I use this analytical approach to examine the 
case of Sudanese political activists resident in the UK. I demonstrate how forms of 
belonging emerge here as part of – and not in isolation from – the strategic navigations 
of multiple political contexts and opportunities. In doing so, I contribute to our 
understanding of how belonging can be contextualized to serve as an analytical lens 
for understanding homeland-oriented migrant activism. 
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When people move away from their homelands and settle elsewhere, they often engage 
in activism directed towards the politics of their homeland.1 Homeland-oriented 
migrant2 campaigns have, in some cases, been analysed as the transnational ‘mouth-
piece’ of homeland campaigns (Georgiou 2003: 62; see also Adi and Lilaker 2017; 
Nesbitt 2004). By contrast, and what is of concern in this article, are cases where 
homeland-oriented migrant campaigns deliver different messages to those being 
delivered in homeland activism (Baser and Swain 2009; Conversi 2012; Koinova 
2014). The central question in this article is how can one explain the incongruities 
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between migrant activism and homeland activism? In the literature, these inconsisten-
cies are attributed to changes in both contexts and identities. In this article, I contribute 
to these debates by examining where and how contextual and identity-based factors 
intersect. This conceptual framework is brought to an analysis of the case of UK-
Sudanese activism. The article asks how are the political campaigns of UK-Sudanese 
different to homeland campaigns in Sudan and how can those differences be explained? 
The findings point towards the utility of a conceptualization of belonging, which 
accounts for strategic negotiations of context as part of, and not separate from, 
processes of identity formation. 
Methods  
This investigation takes UK-Sudanese activism as a case study. The UK-Sudanese have 
formed several publicly active groups renowned for running campaigns that are 
incongruous with homeland activism (Abusharaf 2010; Lanz 2009). The findings of 
this article are based on 41 semi-structured interviews with 27 Sudan-born residents of 
the UK, and 70 informal interviews undertaken during 15 participant observations at 
public demonstration or advocacy events. All data were collected between January 
2014 and October 2014. All semi-structured interviews were conducted in English, bar 
one for which I employed an Arabic translator. The participants were selected because 
of their prior involvement in what Laguerre (2006: 99) called ‘hot and cold’ homeland-
oriented activism. Cold lobbying involves contacting elected officials with a view to 
influencing policy making, whereas hot lobbying is ‘done for immediate results’ and 
may be accompanied by mass demonstrations geared towards shaping not only policy-
making but also public opinion (Laguerre 2006: 99). Initially, participants were 
recruited at demonstrations (hot lobbying) and advocacy events (cold lobbying). Once 
the initial participants were recruited, I used a snowball sampling technique in line with 
Redclift’s (2017: 504) argument that such sampling is necessary ‘in a context in which 
it is impossible to “map” the population from which a random sample might be taken’.  
The participants were drawn from a small, politically active group within the 
broader Sudanese population of the UK, estimated at around 22,000 (IOM 2011: 17). 
The nature of migration from Sudan to the UK over the last half century has been such 
that the broader Sudanese population contains a higher than average proportion of 
refugees and exiles than other migrant groups. Approximately 3000 Sudanese people 
in the UK have refugee status (CARIM 2015) and most of these arrived in the late 
1990s and early 2000s when the Darfur region was particularly unstable. In addition, 
the distribution of political power in Sudan over the last 50 years has meant that many 
of the earlier migrants from Sudan to the UK adopt anti-government, oppositional 
and/or marginalized positions (Abusharaf 1997; Ashu 2012; Di Bartolomeo et al. 
2012; Fábos 2007; Wilcock 2017). During the fieldwork for this research, it became 
apparent that the Sudanese people living in the UK who engage in both hot and cold 
lobbying are almost exclusively from anti-government organizations, or at least they 
hold anti-government views. This campaigning population within the 22,000 Sudan-
born UK population has not been numericized here. To do so would have required a 
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new large-N study and this was beyond the scope of this research. Anecdotally, 
however, several hundred of this population are members of UK-based Sudanese cam-
paigning organizations on social media. The cold lobbying events observed during this 
fieldwork in Manchester, London and Birmingham tended to attract between 20 and 
100 people and hot lobbying events attracted between 150 and 200. It is from this subset 
of UK-based Sudanese campaigners that the participants in this research were drawn. 
All semi-structured interviews and field notes were recorded, transcribed and 
entered into qualitative data analysis software. The participants’ responses were coded 
into contextual and identity factors – the conceptualizations of these categories and 
their justifications are presented below. The data presented here are extracts from semi-
structured interviews and are representative of significant coded patterns found in the 
semi-structured, informal interviews and observations. Written consent was received 
from semi-structured interview participants, and those interviewed informally gave 
verbal consent. As such, no data from informal interviews are quoted directly, but are 
rather used to establish background patterns in the data. Informal interviews and 
participant observations therefore serve to ‘interrogate’ and ‘contextualize’ (Sánchez-
Ayala 2012: 125) the in-depth interviews conducted in this study. 
Migrant activism 
There are two key trends in which migrant campaigns are incongruous with homeland 
campaigns. First, migrants are often uncompromising in their campaigning goals 
compared with locals (Conversi 2012; Lyons 2007; Sheffer 2013). Evidence from 
activist factions among Sikhs in the USA (Tatla 2012), American Basques (Sheffer 
2013) and Tamils abroad (Fair 2005) demonstrates how migrants often take ‘hardline’ 
stances compared with locals (Conversi 2012). In some cases, factions within migrant 
communities have deployed extremist or violent politics. Adamson (2005: 32) des-
cribed sections of the Kurdish, Kosovan and Tamil migrant communities as ‘trans-
national networks of political violence’. However, the term ‘uncompromising’ here 
refers to the promulgation of more dramatic campaign goals than those being pursued 
in the homeland and does not necessarily denote extremism or violence. This reflects 
the empirical trend that most homeland-oriented migrant campaigning is neither violent 
nor directly violence-promoting. 
Second, migrant campaigns promote the ‘democratization’ of homeland politics 
even when campaigning homelanders are not promoting it (Careja and Emmenegger 
2012; Kapur 2010; Koinova 2009b; Underhill 2016). It has been argued that migrants 
are ‘more democratic than those of their co-nationals without any type of migration 
experience’ (Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow 2010: 123). This finding has encouraged 
scholars to analyse migrant activists as ‘vectors of … [a] mass-level type of democratic 
diffusion’ (Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow 2010: 122; see also Guarnizo et al. 2003). 
Uncompromising and democratizing stances are common incongruences between 
migrant and homeland activism, but they are neither essential nor exhaustive. See, for 
example, Hall and Kostić (2009) for a discussion of reconciliatory attitudes among 
migrant and homeland communities, or Brinkerhoff (2008) on constructive versus 
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destructive engagements in homeland politics. Furthermore, the above identified 
incongruences do not apply to all members of the same migrant communities. Orjuela 
(2008) has shown how Tamils abroad reacted differently, not only to homeland actors, 
but to each other. In addition, as Baser (2013) argued, it is often community leaders 
who head migrant mobilizations and, while they may make claims to represent a 
broader population, they often do not. Many have asked why some members of the 
same migrant community are constructive and others destructive, or when do migrant 
activists pursue, for example, radical or moderate claims (Koinova 2009a). I focus on 
uncompromising and democratizing stances as incongruences often, but not always, 
observed between migrant and homeland campaigners. Given that the axis of difference 
I explore here is between migrants and homelanders, this will be the key focus area. 
However, as my analysis will show, this need not preclude recognizing differences 
within and among migrant campaigners. 
Context and migrant campaigns 
The key contextual explanation refers to the different political opportunity structures 
migrants experience compared with homelanders (Chaudhary 2016; Koopmans 2004; 
Kuhlmann 2010; Wayland 2004). As Waldinger (2014: 320) argues, ‘once in the 
receiving state, migrants obtain new-found leverage, benefiting from both the wealth 
of the economic environment and the freedom of a polity no longer controlled by the 
home government.’ This relative freedom is complemented by the security associated 
with distance. As Conversi (2012: 1359) explains, migrant activists are ‘acting from a 
safe distance’ and therefore ‘do not put their safety at risk’. The freedom to express 
uncompromising stances gained from an exterior positionality can explain why 
migrants might pursue radical campaigning goals that locals have strategically 
renounced. A notable example of this is the increase in ethnic-nationalism among 
American Armenians (Sheffer 2013: 23–4). 
Contextual factors also account for the democratizing agendas often found within 
migrant campaigns. Miall et al. (2011: 14) argued that the ‘political system of the host 
governments, and the wider foreign policy objectives of the host government’ affect 
migrant mobilizations. Accordingly, the host state’s diplomatic relationship with the 
home state sets the parameters within which migrant activists can be effective. Further-
more, the activities of migrant campaigns are determined by the extent to which and 
the ways in which political space is afforded to them. Marini’s (2013) comparative 
study of Ghanaian associations in the UK and Italy concludes that ‘the roles migrant 
associations play at home are connected to the opportunities they are given to act 
politically in their host countries’ (Marini 2013: 143). The political opportunity struc-
ture in Italy supported Ghanaians to foster associations where they could ‘gain skills to 
manage development projects themselves’ whereas similar opportunities were ‘very 
limited in the UK’ (Marini 2013: 143). 
As well as navigating political opportunity structures, Demir (2015) and Orjuela 
(2017) demonstrated that migrant activists negotiate discursive norms. Demir (2015: 
71) discusses how a group of mobilized Kurds in London were aware of the need to 
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make their activism ‘palatable’ to a British audience. They used ‘translation’ tactics to 
present their ethno-political struggle in the context of contemporary London. Else-
where, Demir (2017: 276) refers to migrant activists as ‘everyday critical discourse 
analysts’ to describe the discursive confines in which migrant activism plays out. In 
Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) terms, democratizing agendas in migrant campaigns have 
been analysed as artefacts of the ‘boomeranging’ tactics of migrant activists who attach 
their local political campaigns onto broader global issues (Lyons and Mandaville 2012).  
Belonging and migrant campaigns 
he above contextual factors explain how disparities between migrant campaigns vis-à-
vis homeland campaigns are necessitated by the new socio-political environments in 
which homeland-oriented migrant activism takes place. These contextual factors, 
which have dominated analysis of homeland-oriented migrant activism, are 
complemented by identity-based analyses. There are two key approaches to analysing 
how migrant belonging accounts for disparities between migrant and homeland 
political campaigning. These reflect two sides of a broader debate on how best to 
understand migrant belonging – (a) as diasporic (purely homeland-oriented) or (b) as 
transnational (oriented towards both home and hostland).  
First, some hold that wanting to belong to a homeland initiates processes of imagin-
ing it in highly symbolic ways. Lyons (2007) argues that this compulsion produces a 
need to imagine it as a place of continual trauma and suffering, thus easing any shame 
associated with migrating and remaining away. With reference to the case of Ethiopians 
abroad, he argues that ‘characterizing the regime in the homeland as brutal provides a 
rationale to remaining outside of the homeland’ (Lyons 2007: 533), which is why many 
exiled Ethiopians frame the conflict in ‘categorical, uncompromising terms’ (2007: 
535). In addition, exclusionary hostland regimes have been shown to encourage 
migrants to romanticize their homeland as a bastion of former belonging (Silva 2009). 
Looking at the experiences of Turks in Germany, Diehl and Schnell (2006) suggested 
that a lack of status in the hostland can result in the animation of symbolic homeland 
belonging in the form of ethnically-oriented politics. Thus, ruptures in homeland 
belonging have been used to explain renewed nationalist or secessionist campaigns 
among migrants when such views are in decline among homelanders, or even against 
the latter’s interests (Baser and Swain 2009). 
Second, scholars invoking the transnational identity thesis (Schiller et al. 1992; 
Vertovec 2001) argue that belonging to a hostland can explain why migrant activists 
often promote more democratic reforms to homeland politics than homeland activists. 
Here, belonging is seen as a ‘multi-sited embeddedness’ (Horst 2017) pertaining to both 
the hostland and homeland (Boccagni et al. 2016; Cheran 2003; Guarnizo et al. 2003; 
Levitt 1998). Waldinger (2014: 327) argues that migration and resettlement often create 
a change in identity whereby migrants experience a form of ‘cultural diffusion’ (Levitt 
1998) or the ‘adjustment to and acceptance of the main norms, laws, patterns of 
behaviour, etc. that are prevailing in the countries of residence’ (Sheffer 2013: 15). 
Ahmadov and Sasse (2016: 1) argue that ‘the possibility that migrants moving to a more 
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democratic, more developed, and less corrupt country might adopt these norms and 
values and become drivers of political, economic, legal or social change in their home 
country is intriguing and plausible’. Thus, the experience of belonging to a ‘democratic’ 
hostland is held to be responsible for democratizing agendas in homeland-oriented 
migrant activism.  
Constructing belonging in context 
Some scholars have criticized the above approaches for their implicit passivity in that 
they portray belonging to a homeland or hostland as something that happens to mig-
rants. They take for granted that migrant activists will reassert their identification with 
their homeland as part of an assumed ‘ethnocommunal consciousness’ arising from 
shared heritage (Safran 1991: 83–4). Similarly, they present the ‘diffusion’ of hostland 
norms into migrant consciousness as a natural consequence of migration and resettle-
ment. Against this view, it has been argued extensively that belonging of any kind is 
non-essential and constructed (Bauböck 2010: 315; Brubaker 2017; Clifford 1994). 
Within this constructivist conceptualization, the notion of diasporic belonging has been 
re-evaluated as a ‘mobilization process’ (Sökefeld 2006: 265), or an identity that must 
be ‘activated to come into existence’ (Bauböck 2010: 315). Taking up this account of 
belonging, several scholars have asked what mobilizes an orientation to a homeland 
among migrants. Many studies have shown how elites can mobilize or manipulate a 
‘diasporic identity’ for political ends (Adamson 2013; Betts and Jones 2015). 
Alternatively, Kleist’s (2008: 320) work on Somali Danes shows that a ‘diasporic 
identity’ can be mobilized as ‘a moral community’ in contradistinction to political 
warlordism at home. 
Transnational belonging has also been re-evaluated within social constructivist 
ontologies as migrants’ wilful construction of cultural diffusion or assimilation. As 
Erdal and Oeppen (2013: 870) put it, increasingly, integration is being understood as a 
‘process of negotiation’. They argue that ‘the political normative aspect of integration 
is strong … it can also be politically construed as a goal, an end to a process which 
leads to a fully integrated citizen’ (Erdal and Oeppen 2013: 876). There is thus an 
increasing understanding that migrants (and hostland actors) can initiate so-called 
‘cultural diffusion’ to accrue the perceived benefits of holding an ‘integrated identity’.  
Identity-based explanations for the differences between homeland-oriented migrant 
campaigning and campaigns in the homeland fail to integrate fully the above con-
structivist accounts of migrant belonging. Belonging per se holds no explanatory 
weight; mobilizing agendas and activation principles that are fundamentally embedded 
in and reactive to contexts must accompany it. What is missing in identity-based 
analyses of migrant campaigning is an account of how and why ostensibly primordial 
expressions of belonging are socially constructed within socio-political contexts, as 
well as an account of how and why practices and discourses of homeland longing, 
and/or cultural diffusion, are performed within political and discursive opportunity 
structures. In other words, how does belonging intersect with context during homeland-
oriented migrant campaigning?  
Why are migrant campaigns different from homeland campaigns? 
 7 
Sudanese activism at home and abroad 
The political campaigns of Sudanese residents in the UK differ from those of Sudanese 
activists in Sudan in two distinct yet related ways. First, the UK-Sudanese campaigns 
are centred on support for the International Criminal Court’s indictment of President 
Omar Al Bashir in ways that do not represent local activism in Sudan. This concurs 
with the finding that migrant activists often pursue more ‘uncompromising’ stances 
than homelanders (Conversi 2012; Lyons 2007; Sheffer 2013). The ICC indictment has 
been highly controversial in Sudan. Some factions within the Northern opposition 
parties and rebel groups initially supported the indictment, seeing it as ‘welcome 
leverage’ that ‘improved their prospects of accessing power’ (International Crisis 
Group 2009: 1; Nouwen and Werner 2010: 957). However, most opposition groups in 
Sudan have since objected to the indictment, claiming it is an imposition from an 
external agency that denies them the right to choose their own government (De Waal 
2008). Many political leaders agree that justice should be part of Sudan’s transition 
from conflict to peace, but that it should come after reconciliation rather than alongside 
it. Furthermore, commentators in Sudan argue that African, Arab and Sudanese judges, 
and not the Western-centric ICC, should lead the transitional justice processes (Sudan 
Tribune 2009). Currently, much of the Sudanese opposition sees the indictment as 
potentially destabilizing in an already fragile political situation. 
By contrast, campaigns among the Sudanese abroad support foreign intervention 
(Abusharaf 2010; Mamdani 2009). As Abusahraf (2010: 74) argues, the Darfuris in the 
USA have ‘forged strategic alliances that are deeply at odds with Darfurians at home’. 
Concurring with this, in the UK, I found that public protests and lobbying events 
supported the ICC indictments and President Al Bashir’s arrest. Popular demonstration 
slogans included ‘No fly zone in Darfur’, ‘Stop genocide in Darfur and Nuba 
Mountains’ and, most commonly, ‘Al Bashir to ICC’ (fieldwork observations, January–
October 2014). The campaign literature claimed that, ‘by recognizing that genocide is 
happening, the United Kingdom and United Nations will be legally required to take 
action to protect the civilians of Sudan’ (‘Stand for Sudan’, campaign literature, 2014). 
Overall, campaigns among the UK-Sudanese in 2014 attempted to trigger international 
commitments to intervene under the Responsibility to Protect doctrine.  
The second way in which Sudanese activism in the UK diverges from its homeland 
counterpart in is its drive for democratization, which does not reflect the campaigning 
agendas on the ground in Sudan. While sustainable democratization has always been 
part of the agenda of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and other 
opposition parties (Johnson 2013: 145), people in Sudan forcefully resisted the demo-
cratic reforms of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and its legacy (Bereketeab 
2015). Resistance is not generally motivated by a resistance to democracy in abstract, 
but rather emerges as a protest against the pale imitation of genuine democracy offered 
in corrupt elections. Such elections have served to legitimize a semi-autocratic govern-
ment in Sudan and have not resulted in democratization (Bereketeab 2015: 4). In 
presenting substitutes for electoral democratization, campaigns in Sudan promote 
numerous alternative political reform movements. For example, the Sudanese Shadow 
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Cabinet aims to change the government through the renewed political engagement of 
the polity and adapting Sudanese politics to a multi-party system. Alternatively, 
Sudanese for Change focuses on establishing a new social contract between the 
government and polity. Youth-led social movement groups like Girifna and Abena have 
supported boycotting elections in an attempt to support a change of government through 
a bloodless coup. 
Conversely, UK-Sudanese campaigners promote electoral democratization. Most 
UK-Sudanese advocacy activism – in both hot and cold forms – promotes democratic 
electoral reforms as they appear in the CPA and its legacy policies. For example, a 
campaign letter to the then UK prime minister David Cameron, signed by 46 UK-
Sudanese associations, stated that ‘the conflicts in Sudan are rooted in part in demands 
for genuine transformative political reform: for a dismantling of the decades-long 
authoritarian system and for realization of an inclusive, democratic system.’ The pro-
motion of electoral reform, as opposed to the political changes in the campaign agendas 
of domestic locals in Sudan, identifies the campaigning culture of the UK-Sudanese as 
at odds with that of the homelanders. The Sudanese in the UK therefore exemplify the 
most common differences between homeland campaigns and migrant campaigns by 
being both more ‘uncompromising’ and more ‘democratizing’. 
Explaining uncompromising stances  
The most striking explanation for why the UK-Sudanese support ICC intervention 
relates to context. While high on the agenda at both hot and cold lobbying events, those 
attending the events seldom expressed support for ICC intervention in interviews. Low 
levels of support for ICC intervention were expressed especially by those who had 
migrated from Khartoum and belonged to political parties. Shahid, an adviser to one of 
the main opposition parties, said he ‘would like to see change being made from within 
Sudan because it will be more acceptable and credible to the Sudanese people’. Abbas, 
from another opposition party, claimed ‘people are not interested in any military action, 
not from UK or USA. It would create a humanitarian crisis’. Malik, also part of the 
political opposition, was concerned that ‘if you take Bashir to The Hague you will 
create anarchy in a country where there already is a power vacuum.’ 
A key reason why they attended lobbying events that called for ICC intervention 
was their awareness of the need to work within political opportunity structures. As 
Mohammed put it, the UK-Sudanese campaigners are aware that ‘international 
advocacy always needs to be what they [the international community] want.’ However, 
campaigning in this environment was highly strategic and complex, and did not only 
involve mimicking international norms or diplomatic approaches. Mahjid realized that 
the current diplomatic environment made foreign intervention impossible. He said, ‘the 
UK is not going to go into another Muslim country – not after Iraq’ and others argued, 
‘I understand that the ICC is not going to send Black Hawks to pick-up Bashir. It’s just 
not going to happen.’ Knowing that campaigning would come to nothing, they used it 
to achieve other, more subtle goals. As Shahid explained, ‘Bashir is trying to be the 
centre of change and when we send a message like that, the international community 
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have difficulty accommodating him.’ Supporting the campaign for ICC-led transitional 
justice was, for many UK-Sudanese campaigners, not straightforwardly about bringing 
about ICC intervention. They saw that intervention did not fit with UK foreign policy 
and appreciated the futility of such a campaign message. However, they still took the 
opportunity to ‘send a message’ that expressed the overall undesirability of the Sudan-
ese government.  
The above testimonies concur with prior research confirming the importance of 
political and discursive opportunity structures (Demir 2015; Koopmans 2004; Orjuela 
2017). However, the navigation of opportunity structures – while valid – is an inade-
quate explanation for why Sudanese activists in the UK support the ICC. While most 
of the Khartoumian political elite among the UK-Sudanese strategically feigned their 
support for ICC intervention, some among the campaigning population actually did 
support it. These tended to be campaigners from marginal areas of Sudan, who were 
not necessarily involved in politics before they left, and who arrived in the UK with 
refugee status in the early 2000s. Among this group, many reported becoming anti-
government since migrating. When Waleed, a refugee from Darfur who arrived in the 
UK in the early 2000s, was asked whether he was involved in the opposition movement 
before he came to the UK, he replied:  
No, because when you are there you have no idea what is happening. I’m from 
Darfur and you don’t have any freedom to go and learn but when I came here I 
realized things don’t have to be that way. Living is hell at the moment; there are 
wars everywhere. People are dying. Just everything. 
This awakening of anti-government attitudes after migration was noted among 
many UK-Sudanese campaigners who had come from marginal areas in Sudan such as 
Darfur, Blue Nile and the Nuba Mountains. In fact, my research even revealed evidence 
of increased levels of anger towards the Sudanese government among Khartoum’s 
political elites. SPLM-N activist Farooq reported: 
I’m astonished at the level [of anger], if you go in to social forums [on the 
internet] the level of opposition and the tenor of discussion is so heated and 
intense in a way that we don’t encounter in Sudan. So, there is something. The 
level is so high – if you sit in a meeting in Sudan [via skype conference] and 
people living in Sudan comment and say ‘What’s wrong with you people?! What 
happened to you?!’ 
That local members of the SPLM-N asked their UK-based colleagues ‘what happened 
to you?’ implies that the latter underwent a conversion to more uncompromising anti-
government stances following their migration. While the opportunity structures can 
explain some support for ICC intervention, it fails to account for the increased anger 
toward the Sudanese government and the fresh uptake of anti-government views. 
When reflecting on these changes themselves, the UK-Sudanese activists consis-
tently identified a change in perspective as responsible for the hardening of their 
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opposition to the Sudanese government. Waleed described how his new positionality 
in the UK transformed his impression of Sudan; he now realizes that ‘things don’t have 
to be that way’ and that while he was living in Darfur he had ‘no idea what was happen-
ing’. It is only now, after migrating, that he realizes ‘there are wars everywhere’ and 
‘living is hell’. He claims that this is what helped him decide to join an opposition 
political party after his arrival in the UK. 
In the same way, several other activists referred to the experience of migration as 
epiphanic of homeland suffering. One opposition party activist claimed that 
when you are abroad you can see things better than the ones inside who are 
under fear. When you are away from your country you will feel this. … 
Sometimes important is you learn about your suffering away from your country. 
It changes you a lot and it changes your understanding of so many things. I know 
it is very sad to leave your country but still there are so many benefits from it. 
Douhiba said that the experience of migrating helped her ‘see things better’; it 
meant ‘learning about your suffering’. Others spoke of a new ‘clarity’ or ‘clear-
mindedness’ achieved through repositioning their orientation towards the homeland 
from the vantage point of the UK. As Farooq put it, ‘I think it’s because people become 
so angry [following migration] that such nonsense is taking place – people become 
more energetic and more impatient because they see it doesn’t have to be so.’ 
As such, there is evidence of an intensification of opposition to the state brought 
about by the reimagining of home from abroad (Diehl and Schnell 2006; Lyons 2007; 
Silva 2009). However, when asking what has mobilized this new perspective, it appears 
that, for many UK-Sudanese, the ‘clear-mindedness’ is a constructed part a ‘UK-
Sudanese’ identity, which helps to justify the involvement of the Sudanese abroad in 
Sudan’s growth as a post-conflict state. In parts of Farooq’s testimony, the clarity 
associated with being abroad justifies his and his co-migrants’ role in Sudan’s 
transitional politics: 
[When you are in Sudan] you don’t break that cycle of reaching the logical 
conclusion that what I suffer is not the natural order of things. You need to look 
wider and see wider and I was always astonished at how transformative it is to 
come into contact with different cultures, different modes of existence. Different 
social and cultural morays, it brings people to the point where it actually opens 
their minds to new possibilities and new ways of seeing the world. So, diaspora 
needs to have a role in change. We as a diaspora feel that that work has to be 
done. 
It is important to see this passage in which Farooq depicts suffering as ‘not the natural 
order of things’, due to the ‘mind being opened’ up through contact with ‘different 
social and cultural morays’, within the context of the statement’s overall purpose. The 
notion of a ‘transformative mind-opening’ fits in with the idea that ‘diaspora needs to 
have a role in change’. Here, as with many of the political elites among the UK-
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Sudanese campaigners, the ‘new perspective’ is linked to the role that Sudanese people 
living abroad can play in homeland change.  
In making use of the political opportunity afforded by residency in a new context, 
many Sudanese activists in the UK have identified an innovative perspective that has 
something fresh to offer their campaigning colleagues in Sudan. In doing so, these 
activists are justifying their own role in political change in the homeland. In line with 
Søkefeld’s (2006) idea of ‘mobilized’ belonging, one should view the reported clarity 
as the active construction of a ‘UK-Sudanese identity’, set apart from, yet with some-
thing unique to offer to, locals. The advantages of being in a new political environment 
is not the only explanation for the intensification of anti-government sentiment. We 
should also read the reported transformative experience as an act designed to set the 
UK-Sudanese apart from locals, to reassert their membership in the political 
movements they left behind, and to carve out a role for themselves in Sudan’s 
progression towards political change. The process of identity formation, therefore, has 
been strategically utilized as a political opportunity, particularly by elite political 
factions within the UK-Sudanese population. 
Explaining ‘democratizing’ stances 
As Chaudhary (2016), Koopmans (2004) and Waldinger (2014) argued, political and 
discursive opportunity structures have played a part in shaping the democratizing 
content of Sudanese activism in the UK. Since the activists knew that their campaigning 
goals needed to appeal to British policy makers and public audiences, they adjusted 
them accordingly. In other words, they clearly recognized the need to ‘articulate [their] 
politics differently … and present the Sudanese case using universal language’. Their 
decision to promote democratization as a remedy for conflictive diversity politics was 
a manifestation of this awareness. However, as I show below, this only partially 
explains the democratizing agenda of UK-Sudanese campaigns.  
That many migrant activists link their ideological affinity with democratization to 
the transformative experience of belonging to another political culture supports the 
‘cultural diffusion’ (Levitt 1998) approach to belonging. As Abdul explained, ‘there is 
something in us which opens us to being influenced by the models of behaviours around 
us – cultural appropriation … coming to Britain, it alerts you to the possibilities, the 
social possibilities of managing diversity through democracy.’ Zahir spoke of how ‘we 
want to reflect the British and European ethics and culture’ and Karim even suggested 
that he came to the UK to ‘copy some of the lovely social devices you have’. Malik, a 
founding member, attributed the key principles of his society to his experiences of 
British political institutions: ‘[The Sudanese Shadow Cabinet] is modelled on British 
government. … This country definitely inspired all of the shadow cabinet, and even the 
world of democracy.’ While some Sudanese activists were critical of British politics, 
when making comparisons with their homeland, they mostly spoke of it in a positive 
light. To this extent, experiential changes associated with belonging to a different politi-
cal context are made explicit in the UK-Sudanese activists’ own explanations for why 
their campaigns tend to support the ‘democratization’ of Sudanese political institutions.  
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Nevertheless, my research findings do not support the passive ‘cultural diffusion’ 
thesis seen in the works of Waldinger (2014), Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow (2010), and 
Ahmadov and Sasse (2016). Expressions of belonging to hostland cultures and value 
systems, when viewed in the context of their outward expressions, emerge as the active 
performance of constructed transnational belonging. The democratization narratives in 
the political campaigns of the UK-Sudanese are often not relayed within and among 
the activists themselves, but instead appear most strongly as forms of knowledge 
expressed for homeland actors and/or for international actors. 
The same activists who claimed that their immersion in the political traditions of 
the hostland culture transformed their opinions about how to build a new Sudan, also 
revealed that their reading of the conflict and its solutions had, to a large extent, 
preceded their migration and resettlement. Farooq describes how, 
before I came here I was leaning to ideas of the left, or socialism. I was 16/17, I 
was fairly active. So, I had a bit of political consciousness when I came here. 
I also used to read a lot, I saw the world in political terms from an early age 
… I used to be involved in the student union. 
Karim speaks of how ‘my background [in Sudan] is in the trade union. I was in the 
labour party’. Musa, for his part, said, 
I am a political activist. I started politics when I was in university [in Sudan]. At 
the time I was in secondary school. … Then is the state when you are growing 
mentally. At that time, I was interested in sociological history, at that time we 
studied the history of Sudan, of Europe. This interest gradually grew. 
Zahir recalled that ‘I have been engaged in civil society since 1974 [when he still lived 
in Sudan], we were engaged in a wonderful peace association – the Republican 
Brothers. From that time, I am committed to changing societies.’ 
As these testimonies show, many of the ideas that UK-Sudanese activists self-
identified as ‘British’ were formulated while they were still living in Sudan. For many, 
it was clear that their acquaintance with concepts like social contracts, electoral 
democratization and diversity management pre-existed their migration. In this sense, 
the experience of belonging to a so-called ‘British’ political culture is less significant 
than they had led us to believe in their earlier statements. What emerges as significant is 
their need to link their UK positionality to an affinity with democratic institutions. It 
has become imperative to perform, in discourse, this transformation of political attitudes 
and, explicitly, to link these transformations to their identities as UK-Sudanese.  
The discursive act of ‘cultural diffusion’ performs two functions for the UK-Sudanese 
activists. First, it helps to justify their place in Sudan’s post-conflict transition. As 
Douhiba put it, ‘when we go to the parliament, we ask for help with democratization. 
To ask for everything that is great about Britain to be sent back to Sudan. That is our 
role.’ A campaigner from the Sudanese Congress Party claimed that ‘diaspora has to 
have a role in change. Why? Because we can learn things here and then bring them 
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home. Diaspora needs to have a role in change.’ In the same way as diaspora activists 
constructed ‘clear-mindedness’ to show the value that UK-Sudanese could add to 
opposition activism, one can also see support for democratization as a practice and 
discourse of inclusion. What first appears as a product of belonging to a hostland, emerges 
is a means to belong, an attempt to belong, or even a request to belong to a homeland. 
The second function of performed cultural diffusion among UK-Sudanese activists 
is that it brings about a sense of belonging to the UK as the place of residence. As Abdul 
explained, ‘we want to ally with people who will be mobilized to come together. … 
We need to be closer to the British people and the decision makers to be an effective 
community.’ Zakir claimed that ‘we are part of this society and we have so much to 
give to it – we understand it and we are part of this wonderful democracy.’ The ‘democ-
ratizing’ agenda in UK-Sudanese activism is therefore both an expression of belonging 
to a homeland and an attempt to belong, to form a political identity within a hostland. 
To summarize, in seeking to understand what shapes migrant activism, it is impor-
tant to think of migrants not only as ‘vectors of cultural diffusion’ (Pérez-Armendáriz 
and Crow 2010: 122), but also as mobilized political performers who cultivate their 
own belonging, not to a generalized ‘homeland’ but to specific processes of political 
change within it. Furthermore, these yearnings to belong – ostensibly to a homeland – 
can also be understood as attempts to carve out a political identity in a host society. In 
other words, expressing an identity that has undergone cultural diffusion serves as an 
attempt to gain acceptance in two types of political culture – that of the hostland and 
that of the homeland. Again, the process of identity formation is being used to create 
political opportunities to belong to these two spaces. 
Conclusion 
In this study, I examined why political campaigns organized by migrant activists are 
often different from homeland ones. By situating practices and discourses of identity 
formation within the political and discursive opportunity structures in which campaigns 
take place, I incorporated both contextual and identity-based factors. In doing so, I 
found that where migrant and homeland political campaigns differ – as they often do – 
explanations based on either identity changes and/or political opportunity structures are 
insufficient on their own. While contextual factors are valid – and the UK-Sudanese 
case suggests they matter – they may be incomplete without an understanding of the 
contextual nature of constructed belonging. Similarly, while changes to identity shape 
migrant activism, it is only when viewed in conjunction with context that these changes 
can be fully understood. Not only is there something to be gained from understanding 
the interplay of belonging and context, but also some contextual explanations may be 
misattributed to practices and discourses of belonging and vice versa. What first 
appeared as a context driven change among UK-Sudanese was in fact identity driven, 
and what appeared as identity driven change was in fact context driven. In any case, 
identity formation was used as part of – not separate from – the strategic navigations of 
restrictive contexts. In the light of that, in this article I put forward the view that identity 
and contextual factors really must be analysed together. 
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Two findings emerged from the research that speak to broader debates on concep-
tualizations of belonging in ‘diasporic’ and ‘transnational’ politics. This research 
supports a performative understanding of identity as of key importance in diasporic 
identity formation. What emerged strongly from the UK-Sudanese case are the ways in 
which migrant activists are instrumental in outlining what they can bring to Sudan’s 
political changes. These contributions took centre stage in how these migrants 
presented themselves as ‘UK-Sudanese’ and what kinds of diasporic identities they 
assumed. The reported ‘clear-mindedness’ and the lived experience of UK political 
institutions were two aspects of diasporic identity they actively constructed and 
consistently performed. As such, what one may otherwise identify as instances of 
naturalized homeland belonging, may be performances made with the agenda of 
constructing belonging to a homeland. In other words, the formation of a ‘diasporic 
identity’ can be as much a process towards homeland belonging as it can be its product. 
The second finding concerns how only diasporic belonging (namely a homeland-
oriented one) is insufficient to explain the form and content of homeland-oriented 
politics. Some aspects of homeland-oriented campaigning were intentional acts of 
belonging to the hostland. Even although UK-Sudanese campaigns were ostensibly 
directed towards Sudan, they contained discursive and performative elements that were 
both motivated and brought about by belonging to host societies. This points to a need 
to reanalyse the relationship between homeland-oriented migrant activism and 
transnational identities. Multi-sited belonging, as opposed to homeland-oriented 
belonging could offer a richer understanding of what has, until now, been referred to 
as ‘diaspora’ activism. 
Overall, through looking at the identity-formation practices of migrant activists as 
they are embedded in political and discursive contexts, this research has shown the 
active role that migrant activists play in constructing their belonging to homeland 
politics. These identity formation practices can explain why their campaigns are often 
more uncompromising and more democratizing than the campaigns in the homelands 
themselves. This contributes to a move away from understanding migrant activism as 
brought about by passive experiences of homeland longing and cultural diffusion, and 
towards understanding migrant identity formation as part of strategies to convert 
exclusion into inclusion – in both home and hostland contexts. 
Notes 
1. See Østergaard-Nielsen (2003: 762–3) for a typology of migrant political participation. The 
concern of this article is with ‘homeland politics’, or what ‘pertains to the domestic or foreign 
policy of the homeland’ (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003: 762). 
2. The subjects of this study are referred to as ‘migrant activists’ as opposed to ‘diaspora 
activists’. ‘Diaspora’ here, refers to an analytical approach to migrant belonging, namely one 
that is oriented towards a homeland. This approach can be viewed in contradistinction to 
‘transnational belonging’, or ‘multi-sited embeddedness’ (Horst 2017). The term ‘diaspora’ 
is used descriptively elsewhere to signal migrant communities connected to homelands, but 
here I deploy it analytically as opposed to descriptively. Therefore, I only use ‘diaspora’ 
when referring to the analytical approach to belonging denoted by it. 
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